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The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets:  
Evidence from Asia’s Financial Crisis 
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This study examines the role of internal capital markets and diversification during 
normal and turbulent times.  We hypothesize that internal markets are more valuable 
for firms in countries with less-developed financial markets and that diversification 
generally reduces risk. To conduct our tests, we study 3,000 East Asian corporations 
over the period before and during the 1997-1998 financial crisis. We find support for 
the internal market hypothesis during normal times. We find, however, that more 
diversified firms perform worse during a crisis, especially in less-developed countries.  
This suggests that more diversification and greater usage of internal markets is 
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The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets:  
Evidence from Asia’s Financial Crisis 
 
1.   Introduction 
There has been substantial research documenting the pattern of diversification 
among firms in the United States, e.g., Lamont (1997), Houston, James and Marcus 
(1997), and Scharfstein (1998).  The evidence indicates that such diversification 
reduces firm value (see Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment 
and Jarrell (1995), Servaes (1996), Shin and Stulz (1998), Lins and Servaes, 1999a 
and 1999b, among others).  The value discount has been attributed to poor resource 
allocation as diversified firms allocate capital to less profitable segments and increase 
risks.  The question arises as to why corporations diversify.   
One explanation pioneered by Williamson (1985) and extended by Gertner, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), Harris and Raviv (1996), and Stein (1997), is that 
capital-constrained firms establish internal capital markets to allocate scarce capital 
within the firm.  This is particularly the case for projects which are not inherently 
fundable by external markets.  Internal markets can overcome informational 
asymmetries involved in the selection of valuable new projects more easily than can 
external markets. The more costly it is for firms to obtain external capital, the more 
valuable internal capital markets would be.  One would also expect more 
diversification to lead to a reduction in firms’ overall performance variability.  This 
risk reduction presumably would be even greater when external financial markets are 
less developed, since internal diversification is an efficient means of reducing risk. 
A test of the internal capital market hypothesis would therefore involve 
conditioning on a firm’s access to external capital, which can be done by studying 
firms in countries which financial markets are at different levels of development.     3 
Fauver et al. (1999) do so by investigating firm values across 35 countries. They 
document smaller diversification discounts for firms in less developed markets, 
consistent with the hypothesis.  Khanna and Palepu (1999a,b) also argue that 
diversification is valuable in emerging markets since diversified firms mimic the 
beneficial functions of market institutions in more developed countries.  They find 
supporting evidence for this hypothesis in the case of large business groups in India 
and, to a lesser extent, Chile. 
While the benefits of internal markets may be higher in countries with less 
developed financial markets, so might be the costs. Investment projects funded by 
internal markets are not subject to the full degree of monitoring by external capital 
markets, which could mean that they are less profitable or riskier (Jensen (1986, 
1989)). Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (1999) and Scharfstein (1998) also argue that the 
more diverse and complex the investment opportunities available, the more 
pronounced this riskiness is.   Diversified firms are especially likely to face higher 
agency costs as a consequence of their organizational form (see Scharfstein and Stein 
(1997), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), and Scharfstein (1998)).  Lins and Servaes 
(1999b) find discounts for diversification in less-developed countries and interpret 
this as evidence for higher agency costs. 
The findings by Fauver et al. (1999) and Khanna and Palepu (1999a,b) 
nevertheless suggest that the relative benefits of internal markets offset the costs 
associated with diversification more so in less-developed countries.  They study the 
period from 1992 to 1996, however, when globally capital markets were not very 
turbulent and when economic growth was high in emerging markets.  It is possible 
that this sample period might have overstated the benefits of diversification and 
understated the risk factors, which would only surface during economic downturns.  A   4 
robustness test of the benefits of diversification could therefore be to investigate 
whether diversified firms performed better during economic downturns than non-
diversified firms.  And a test of the relative benefits of internal markets would be to 
investigate whether diversified firms were less affected by the economic downturn in 
less-developed countries because internal markets are more beneficial in such 
countries. 
The objective of this study is to shed additional light on these questions 
associated with diversification and the use of internal markets.  In particular, we test 
whether diversification leads to lower performance variability, whether greater use of 
internal capital markets is more valuable for firms in less-developed countries during 
good timesas it allows more investment in new activities, and whether greater use 
of internal capital markets is more valuable for firms in less-developed countries 
during bad timesas it reduces overall risk more than in countries with more 
developed financial markets. 
We test these hypotheses by studying the performance of firms in East Asian 
countries over the 1992 through 1998 period.  The selection of this sample offers 
several benefits.  First, we study a period which comprises both economic booms and 
busts in the sample countries. Second, the sample spans countries with highly diverse 
levels of financial markets’ development, thus allowing us to control for the 
development of external markets relative to internal markets.  Third, all countries 
were affected by a downturn within a short window, thus limiting the influence of 
other variables on firm valuation.  Finally, East Asian corporations have a record of 
significant use of internal markets when compared to companies in the United States, 
as documented in Fauver et al. (1999) and Lins and Servaes (1999b).     5 
To conduct our tests, we collect panel data for almost 15,000 firm-year 
observations over the 1992-96 pre-crisis and the 1997-98 crisis periods.  Consistent 
with the previous literature, we find a diversification discount.   We also find support 
for the internal capital market hypothesis during the pre-crisis period as diversified 
firms in less-developed countries are valued relatively higher than in more developed 
countries.  We find, however, that diversified firms perform worse than single-
segment firms during the crisis and that diversified firms in less-developed countries 
perform even worse than those in more developed countries.  While our results thus 
confirm the internal markets hypothesis during good times, we show that diversified 
firms take on more overall risks, a factor which only surfaces during economic 
downturns and is more severe in less-developed countries.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data sample. Section 3 
provides the performance and valuation measures we use. Section 4 documents our 
empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.  
2.   The Data 
We study firms in nine countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.  Our primary data source is 
the Worldscope database. Worldscope contains financial and segment information on 
companies from 49 countries and has been used in several international studies of 
corporate diversification, including Lins and Servaes (1999a,b) and Fauver et al. 
(1999). 
  We initially selected all companies from the nine countries covered by the 
June 1991-1999 CD-Rom version of the database.  In each annual dataset, 
Worldscope provides historical financial data and current segment information.   
When Worldscope segment information is missing, we complemented the segment   6 
data with data from the Autumn editions of the 1994-1999 Asian Company Handbook 
and Japan Company Handbook.  All financial data are converted to US dollars using 
fiscal year-end exchange rates.
2 
In order to determine the degree of usage of internal markets, we group 
company segments according to the two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 
system.  This procedure involves two steps.  In the first step, we assign the 
appropriate four-digit SIC codes to each segment reported by Worldscope.
3  In many 
cases we are able to obtain one-to-one matches between SIC codes and segments.  For 
some companies, the number of reported SIC codes is not the same as the number of 
reported segments.  If a segment is associated with multiple SIC codes, it is broken 
down equally so that each segment is associated with one SIC code.  As the second 
step, we redefine segments at the two-digit SIC level and aggregate segment sales to 
that level.  If a segment can not be associated with a reported SIC code, we determine 
the segment’s SIC code according to its business description.  In such cases, only a 
two-digit SIC code was assigned given the more general business description 
provided by Worldscope.  
  We classify firms as single-segment if at least 90 percent of their total sales 
are derived from one two-digit SIC segment.  Firms are classified as multi-segment if 
they operate in more than one two-digit SIC code industries and none of their two-
digit SIC code segments accounts for more than 90 percent of total firm sales.  This 
                                                            
2 Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook and the Japan Company Handbook provide 
information on whether all subsidiaries are consolidated, whether consolidation covers only 
the most significant subsidiaries, or whether the report is on a cost basis (unconsolidated).  If 
a company changes its consolidation practice, this change is also recorded in the data.  To 
increase the sample size, we include all firms in the sample.  Since non-consolidated 
companies are a relatively small fraction of all firms, 23% on average, similar results obtain if 
we exclude firms which have reported non-consolidated accounting data.   
 
3 Worldscope reports SIC codes and segment information separately, hence we do a manual 
matching.   7 
classification scheme is the same as in Lins and Servaes (1999a,b) and Fauver et al. 
(1999).  We further define the primary segment of a multi-segment firm as the largest 
segment by sales.  The remaining segment(s) are defined as secondary segments.  In a 
very small number of cases two largest segments have identical sales.  In such cases 
we select the segment with the lower two-digit SIC code as the primary segment.  Our 
empirical results are robust if the alternative is chosen as the primary segment.  We 
exclude multi-segment firms from the sample when they do not report segment sales 
and firms whose primary business segment is financial services (SIC 6000-6999).
4 
The Asian financial crisis started in mid-1997 in Thailand and spilled over to 
the other East Asian countries in the Fall of 1997.  The beginning month of the crisis 
thus varies from country to country.  Firms also use different fiscal years, varying 
from end-of-December to the middle-of-the-next-calendar year.  To facilitate 
comparison, we define financial data reported prior to December 1997 as pre-crisis 
data.  Since almost all firms have fiscal years ending before the middle-of-the-year, 
we  de facto only include financial data up to mid-1997 in our pre-crisis sample.   
Accordingly, financial data reported on or after December 1997 are classified as crisis 
data and capture the period from mid-1997 to end-1998.  To allow for a meaningful 
pre-crisis and crisis comparison of firms, we restrict our sample to those firms that 
survived in the crisis period.  This survivorship bias means that the risks associated 
with internal markets are underestimated as non-surviving firms will likely have had 
lower market valuation. 
The sample is described in Table 1.  For the pre-crisis period (Panel A), the 
sample includes 7,616 (65%) multi-segment firm-year observations and 4,085 (35%) 
                                                            
   8 
single-segment firm-year observations. Japanese firms comprise the majority of the 
sample, as they account for 79 percent of the multi-segment firms and 71 percent of 
the single-segment firms.  Across the nine countries, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia and Singapore have 64 to 69 percent of multi-segment firms, while Thailand, 
the Philippines, Taiwan and Indonesia have 27, 34, 35 and 42 percent, respectively. 
The average asset size of multi-segment firms is US$2,494 million and 
US$1,846 million of single-segment firms.  Across the nine countries, the average 
asset size of multi-segment firms is larger relative to those of single-segment firms, 
with the exception of South Korea and Singapore.  In the case of both multi-segment 
and single-segment firms, Japanese firms have the largest average assets (US$2,901 
million and US$2,279 respectively), followed by Korean and Hong Kong firms.   
For the crisis period (Panel B), the sample covers 1,999 (65%) multi-segment 
firms and 1,094 (35%) single-segment firms. Japanese firms account for 68 percent of 
multi-segment firms and 56 percent of single-segment firms.  Similar to the pattern in 
the pre-crisis period, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore have 
between 63 to 69 percent of multi-segment firms, while Thailand, the Philippines, 
Taiwan and Indonesia have 27, 37, 35 and 47 percent, respectively. 
Many countries in our sample experienced a sharp depreciation of their 
currency relative to the dollar in the crisis period.  As a result, when measured in 
dollars, asset sizes and sales drop significantly between 1996 and 1997-98.  The 
average asset size of multi-segment firms in the crisis period is reduced by 22 percent 
to US$1,949 million and by 19 percent to US$1,504 million for single-segment 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 We do not exclude non-finance firms with secondary segments in financial services. Since 
the secondary finance segments are typically small relative to the main segment, we do not 
expect significant estimation errors when we compute excess value.   9 
firms.
5  Similar to the pattern in the pre-crisis period, the average assets of multi-
segment firms are mostly larger than those of single-segment firms, except for firms 
in South Korea and Singapore.  Of the multi-segment firms, Japanese firms have the 
largest average assets (US$2,357 million), followed by Korean firms.  Of the single-
segment firms, in contrast to the pre-crisis period, Korean firms have the largest 
average assets (US$2,696 million), followed by Japanese firms. 
3.   Measuring Performance and Financial Development  
3.1.   Excess Value  
In measuring corporate performance, we use the firm’s market valuation and 
excess profit margin.
6  In calculating valuation, we adopt the approach of Berger and 
Ofek (1995) by defining the excess value of a firm (EXV) as the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of the firm’s actual market capitalization to its imputed capitalization.  The 
actual market capitalization is the market value of common equity plus the book value 
of debt.  The imputed capitalization is calculated following an industry-matching 
scheme.  In particular, we first compute the median market-to-sales ratio, the market 
capitalization divided by firm sales, for each industry in each country using only 
single-segment firms.  We then multiply the level of sales in each segment of a firm 
by its corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratio.  The imputed value of the 
                                                            
 
5 This percentage decline is computed by comparing the 1997-1998 sample with the average 
of the 1992-1996 sample.  Since, in local currency terms, the size of firms in the early 90s is 
smaller than in the late 90s, the exchange-rate adjusted total assets in 1997-1998 is not 
necessarily smaller for all East Asian countries than the exchange-rate adjusted total assets for 
the 1992-96 period, in spite of the large exchange rate depreciation for many countries. 
 
6 Prior studies use excess valuation (EXV) as the sole measure of corporate performance since 
capital markets are assumed to be efficient in signaling long term corporate performance.  In 
this study, we cover firms during Asian financial crisis when several stock exchanges saw 
large price falls and may not have measured long-term corporate performance efficiently.  To 
avoid using EXV as the only measure of corporate performance during the crisis, we also use 
the excess profit margin (EPM) as a short-term performance measure.  If East Asian stock   10 
firm is obtained by summing the multiples across all segments.  We also restrict the 
number of single-segment firms to at least three when computing the median market-
to-sales ratio of an industry. When an industry has fewer than three single-segment 
firms, even defined broadly as Campbell (1996), we use the median of all firms in the 
country.  
3.2.   Excess Profit Margin 
The profit margin is calculated as one minus the cost of goods sold over sales. 
Similar to the calculation of EXV, we first use the sub-sample of single-segment firms 
in each country to compute the median profit margin for each two-digit SIC code 
industry.  We then multiply the sales share in each segment of a firm by the 
corresponding industry median profit margin.  We sum the sales-weighted profit 
margin across segments to obtain the imputed profit margin of the firm. Lastly, we 
subtract the imputed profit margin from the actual profit margin to obtain the 
industry-adjusted excess profit margin (EPM). 
In a manner similar to the computation of EXV, we restrict the number of 
single-segment firms in the computation of industry median profit margin to be at 
least three.  In some cases, we do not have a sufficient number of firms to compute the 
median profit margin.  In these cases, we use the median profit margin of broader 
industry groups as defined by Campbell (1996).  This procedure avoids the loss of 
observations.  
3.3.   Weighting Scheme 
We construct the crisis EXV and EPM measures using the pre-crisis weights 
and crisis period market-to-sales ratios and profit margins.  In other words, we test 
how EXV and EPM behave in the crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period, using 
                                                                                                                                                                      
markets were indeed less efficient in valuing long-term corporate performance during the   11 
the pre-crisis corporate segment structure (or distribution of sales) to calculate the 
imputed values in the post crisis period.  One advantage of using the same corporate 
segment structure for each firm is that we can focus on differences in valuation effects 
between the two periods, as the imputed values are not influenced by any segment 
change effects.  At the same time, however, for those firms that change their segment 
composition between the pre-crisis and crisis period, we might have a bias if, across 
all firms, actual value changed due to the shedding or acquiring of business segments 
with relatively low or high values in a common pattern.   
Our presumption is that any changes during the crisis will have led to a higher 
imputed valuation using the original segment structure compared to the new, actual 
structure as diversified firms would more likely have shed loss-making segments in 
the crisis period.  For example, if a diversified firm sheds its car-factory during the 
crisis, and all car firms were valued lower during the crisis period, the imputed value 
of the firm using pre-crisis weights would be below the imputed value of the firm 
using the post-crisis weights.  As a result, the ratio of actual to imputed values would 
be higher using pre-crisis weights compared to using the post-crisis actual weights.  
Since our method more likely assigns higher actual relative to imputed values in the 
crisis period, it implies we have a bias against finding lower values for diversified 
firms, which would strengthen our results if we still find a lower value for diversified 
firms in countries affected by the crisis. 
3.4.   Measuring Financial Development 
In previous studies, financial development has been measured in several ways: 
using per-capita GNP and the World Bank classification of income groups (Fauver et 
al. 1999); the ratio of banking assets to GDP and the ratio of market capitalization to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
crisis, we would expect to find weaker results using EXV than using EPM.   12 
GDP (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999); and the number of initial public offerings, 
number of firms listed on the stock market as a share of total firms, and the ratio of 
external market capitalization to GDP (La Porta et al. 1997).  In this study, we use all 
three sets of measures as alternative proxies for the level of development of financial 
markets.  For the set of countries we study, however, these indicators are not perfectly 
correlated and we can thus expect different results of the effect of financial 
development on the degree of diversification discounts. A priori, we expect that the 
proxies related to capital market development will be less powerful for our sample of 
firms, as firms in East Asia traditionally have relied on bank financing rather than on 
financing from capital markets. 
 
4.   Empirical Analysis 
Panel A of Table 2 compares the mean and median of the excess profit margin 
(EPM) measure between the pre-crisis and crisis periods for all multi-segment firms 
and for multi-segment firms in three groups of countries classified using the World 
Bank income data.
7  Panel B of Table 2 compares the mean and median of the excess 
value (EXV) measure between the pre-crisis and crisis periods for all multi-segment 
firms by the same income group as in Panel A.
8  
                                                            
 
7  The World Bank classifies countries into four categories, namely, high income, upper-
middle income, lower-middle income, and low income. The lower-middle income group 
includes Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, the high income group includes  Japan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, while the higher-middle income countries include Korea 
and Malaysia.  There are no low income countries in our sample. 
 
8   Note that many firms in East Asian countries are affiliated with business groups.  As 
suggested by Wolfenzon (1999), group structures can be associated with divergence of cash 
flow rights from voting rights, and allow expropriation. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 
(1999) document this divergence of voting from cash-flow rights in East Asian corporations 
and show that it is associated with expropriation of minority shareholders.  Khanna and 
Palepu (1999b) in contrast argue that business groups can act as guarantors of property rights 
in an environment where enforcement is weak. As a result, business groups enjoy 
advantageous access to foreign capital and technology providers who seek to safeguard the   13 
The results are consistent with the internal markets hypothesis during good 
times. The mean and median pre-crisis EPM (Panel A) and the mean and median pre-
crisis EXV (Panel B) exhibit a monotonic increase in the level of development, i.e., 
diversified firms in lower income groups have higher performance in the pre-crisis 
period than diversified firms in higher income countries, confirming the predictions of 
the internal markets hypothesis that firms in less-developed countries gain more 
benefits from diversification during good times.  
The overall pattern is inconsistent, however, with the hypothesis that more 
diversification reduces risks.  For all countries combined, the mean and median excess 
profit margin and excess value are negative in both the pre-crisis and crisis period.  In 
other words, multi-segment firms under-performed single-segment firms in both 
periods.  If diversification would have led to a reduction in risks, one would have 
expected that more diversified firms would have experienced a less dramatic decline 
in performance during the crisis period, and would thus have outperformed single 
segment firms at least in the crisis period.  We find the opposite result, i.e., multi-
segment firms perform worse than single-segment firms in the crisis period, and even 
worse compared to the pre-crisis period using all four measures (mean and median 
EPM and EXV), with the difference statistically significant and negative for the mean 
EPM.   A comparison for different groups of countries shows that multi-segment 
firms outperform single-segment firms during the crisis period only in terms of mean 
EPM in lower-income countries, and even then their performance is worse in the 
crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
property rights of their investments. These enhanced property rights in turn can increase value.  
Since there are no a priori reasons, however, to believe that the net effects of these factors 
would change during an economic downturn, we control for these factors by taking the 
differences between the crisis and pre-crisis values of EPM and EXV.   
   14 
The results are also inconsistent with the internal markets hypothesis during 
bad times.  The median differences of EPM and the mean and median differences of 
EXV exhibit a monotonic decline in the level of development as diversified firms in 
lower income groups experience a more dramatic decline in performance, 
contradicting the predictions of the internal markets hypothesis that firms in less-
developed countries gain more benefits from diversification during crisis periods.   
The differences are statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level for lower-
middle–income groups for the EXV measure (Panel B), while the difference is 
significant for higher-middle-income group for the EPM measure (Panel A).  The 
mean differences of EPM exhibit a less clear pattern, with the most significant decline 
in the mean EPM for the higher-middle-income group.  However, the results are 
inconsistent with the internal markets hypothesis as diversified firms in high income 
countries exhibit the least performance decline.
  
To further test the impact of the Asian financial crisis on EPM for different 
levels of diversification and across stages of economic development, we perform the 
following two regressions: 
 
EPM = α + β1*CRISIS + β2*SEG + β3*SEG*CRISIS + β4*Log(ASSETS) + (Fixed 
e f f e c t s )   +   u            ( 1 )  
 
EPM = α + β1*CRISIS + β2*GNP + β3*SEG + β4*SEG*CRISIS + β5*SEG*GNP + 
β6*SEG*GNP*CRISIS + β7*Log(ASSETS) + (Fixed effects) + u      (2) 
 
where CRISIS takes the value 1 for firms reporting after December 1997, and 0 
otherwise.  We include the number of segments, SEG, or a dummy for diversification 
(=1 if more than 1 segment and 0 otherwise).  The explanatory variables also include, 
depending on the specification, several interactive variables: SEG*CRISIS,   15 
SEG*GNP, where GNP is per capita income for each country, SEG*GNP*CRISIS, 
and the natural logarithm of firm assets in thousands of US dollars (Log(ASSETS)) to 
control for any size effect.
9   Whenever we do not include per capita GNP (not 
interacted) in the above regressions, we also control for country effects by including 
country dummies.  Note that we do not need to control for the size of the crisis by 
country or industry since, by construction, EPM and EXV already adjust for changes 
in country-specific industry median values, hence the impact of different degree of 
crisis for each country and each industry is already removed.  The regression is 
performed on the pooled sample. 
Similar regressions are performed for EXV.  If financial markets reflected the 
long-term performance of East Asian corporations less efficiently during the crisis, we 
would observe similar but weaker results for EXV than for EPM.
10 
  Table 3 reports the regression results for EPM.  Regression 1 reports the 
results for equation (1) and regression 2 for equation (2).  The results indicate that 
corporations in East Asian countries performed worse during the financial crisisthe 
variable CRISIS is statistically significant negative, which is hardly a surprise.  The 
negative significance of the diversification dummy variable SEG suggests that 
diversified firms perform worse than single segment firms in normal times.  However, 
diversified firms do not perform worse than single segment firms during the crisis, as 
                                                            
9 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue that firm size should be included as a control 
variable since it may be correlated with firm value.   
 
10 Fauver et al (1999) also control for operating margin and capital expenditure over sales 
ratios in their regression analysis. If we include the capital expenditure over sales ratio in the 
EPM regressions (since excess operating margin is the dependent variable, we cannot further 
control for operating margin itself), the results remain the same. However, since the capital 
expenditure over sales ratio is never significant in the EPM regressions and since we lose 
more than one-third of the crisis sample firms, we omit it from the analysis.  If we include 
both control variables in the EXV regressions, the operating margin is significantly positive, 
while the capital expenditure over sales ratio is not significant.  For the other independent 
variables similar but weaker results are obtained (not reported).    16 
shown by the insignificant coefficient for the interactive variable SEG*CRISIS.  This 
suggests that we can not reject the hypothesis that diversification reduces risks.  We 
need to be cautious in interpreting this result, since we do not yet consider the degree 
of development which has a significant impact on performance as shown in Table 2.   
In particular, the effect of the variable SEG*CRISIS needs to be further decomposed 
to incorporate the effect of economic development.   
In the second specification, per capita GNP itself is insignificant, but 
SEG*CRISIS becomes significantly negative at the 5 percent level which indicates 
that diversified firms perform worse than single segment firms during the crisis. This 
evidence demonstrates that there are no risk reduction benefits from diversification.  
In fact, diversification lowers profitability during the crisis, a finding which has not 
been documented in prior studies.   It may be that the agency costs of diversified firms 
are higher during the crisis.  It is also likely that the effects of misallocation of capital 
associated with more diversification (e.g., Shin and Stulz (1998) among others) 
become more serious during a crisis.  In terms of the test of the internal markets 
hypothesis, we find that the interactive term SEG*GNP is negative but marginally 
insignificant.  This evidence is weakly consistent with the internal capital market 
hypothesis as diversified firms in less-developed countries appear to perform 
relatively better than firms in more developed countries in normal times. 
We argue that the evidence of increased diversification leading to lower profit 
margins during a period of economic downturn is consistent with the notion that risks 
increase with the greater use of internal markets, especially in less-developed 
countries.  To further confirm this hypothesis, we examine the coefficient of 
SEG*GNP*CRISIS.  The negative impact of the crisis on EPM appears higher for 
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diversified firms in less-developed countries as SEG*GNP*CRISIS is significantly 
positive at the 1 percent level.  This result suggests that greater use of internal markets 
allows firms in less-developed countries to take on more overall risks, possibly 
because of the lesser degree of monitoring on investment projects funded by internal 
markets.  This risk factor only surfaces during the economic downturn. 
We repeat the regressions using the number of segments a firm is active in 
instead of the diversification dummy.  Similar results are obtained, while the t-
statistics are generally higher.  In regression 4, per capita GNP is still insignificant, 
but the interactive term SEG*CRISIS is significantly negative at the 5 percent level.  
These results suggest that diversification does not reduce risks, i.e., in a crisis period 
diversification reduces profitability more.  In terms of the tests of the internal markets 
hypothesis, we find that the interactive term SEG*GNP is significantly negative at the 
5 percent level.  This evidence is consistent with the internal capital market 
hypothesis that diversification hurts performance, but less so in countries with less-
developed financial markets during normal times.  The coefficient for 
SEG*GNP*CRISIS is significantly positive at the 1 percent level, suggesting that 
diversification is more harmful in a crisis in less-developed countries.  
Table 4 reports the regression results for EXV.  Regressions 1 and 2 use the 
diversification dummy while regressions 3 and 4 use the number of segments.  The 
results confirm the previous findings for EPM.  Diversification hurts market valuation, 
especially in a crisis, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficients for 
SEG and SEG*CRISIS in several specifications.  The negative valuation effect of 
diversification in a crisis is even worse for countries with less-developed financial 
markets, as the coefficient for SEG*GNP*CRISIS is significantly positive for both   18 
specifications.  We can not confirm the internal capital market hypothesis during good 
times, however, as the interactive variable SEG*GNP is no longer significant. 
Tables 5 and 6 report similar regressions, using the proxies for the depth of 
financial markets as suggested in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999).  The regression 
in Table 5 is as follows: 
EPM = α + β1*CRISIS + β2*FDEV + β3*SEG + β4*SEG*CRISIS + β5*SEG*FDEV 
+ β6*SEG*FDEV*CRISIS + β7*Log(ASSETS) + (Fixed effects) + u   
 (3) 
 
Where FDEV is either the ratio of bank assets to GDP ratio in columns (1) and (3), or 
the ratio of market capitalization to GDP in columns (2) and (4).  As before, we find 
that diversification is associated with lower performance during the crisis since the 
coefficient on SEG*CRISIS is always negative and significantly so, with the 
exception of regression (2).  The negative effect of diversification is again worse 
during a crisis and in countries with less-developed financial markets, as the 
coefficient on SEG*FDEV*CRISIS is always positive.  The effect is statistically 
significant for the banking sector proxy and marginally insignificant for the capital 
market proxy, the latter possibly because firms in East Asia generally rely more on 
bank than capital markets financing.  The coefficients on SEG*FDEV are generally 
inconsistent with the internal market hypothesis in good times as firms in countries 
with more developed financial markets have better performance.  
  The regressions using EXV show a similar pattern (Table 6), albeit the results 
are less strong than those for EPM.  We find larger diversification discounts during 
the crisis period, and these discounts are more prevalent in countries with less 
developed financial markets.  As in the previous tables, the coefficients on 
SEG*CRISIS are always negative, and they are statistically significant in regressions   19 
(1) and (3).  The coefficients on SEG*FDEV*CRISIS are always positive, but again 
only significant in regressions (1) and (3).  
  For robustness purposes, we also use as proxies for financial market 
development the variables suggested by La Porta et al. (1997), i.e., the ratio of 
external capital to GDP, the number of initial public offerings relative to the country’s 
population, and the number of publicly traded firms relative to the total number of 
firms (not reported).  For all three proxies, we find consistent results, i.e., 
diversification hurts corporate performance more during the crisis period, and this 
pattern is more pronounced in countries with less developed capital markets.  Unlike 
the results we report, however, the coefficients are almost always insignificant.
11  This 
is not surprising, since many firms in East Asian countries rely mostly on banks for 
their financing needs, and capital markets indicators may not be good proxies for 
financial market development.  
5.   Conclusions 
In the context of corporate diversification, one answer to the frequently asked 
question why corporations diversify is that capital-constrained firms use internal 
capital markets to more effectively allocate scarce capital within the firm.  This 
argument would imply that diversification would reduce risks for all levels of 
development, and that internal capital markets are most valuable in countries with 
less-developed financial markets.  Indeed, previous evidence has found smaller 
diversification discounts for firms in developing countries.   
We argue, however, that because investment projects funded by internal 
markets are less subject to monitoring than those funded by external capital markets, 
diversified firms may allocate capital to riskier projects, especially in countries with   20 
less-developed financial markets.  Empirically, we find that, while internal markets 
are more valuable in less-developed countries during good times, diversification leads 
to lower profit margins and lower valuation for firms in less-developed countries 
during a period of economic downturn.  This suggest risks increase with greater use of 
internal markets, especially in less-developed countries. 
Our findings suggest that internal markets are not always used to overcome 
financial market imperfections, while at the same time keeping risks constant or 
decreasing risks.  Instead, they are often used to fund high-risk activities, which are 
more difficult to finance outside the firm.  This suggests that focussing on good times 
and ignoring crisis periods in an analysis can underestimate the costs of internal 
markets in any country and can overstate the relative benefits of internal markets in 
less-developed countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 The exception is the ratio of publicly-traded firms to the total number of firms interacted 
with SEG and CRISIS, which has a positive coefficient.   21 
References:  
Berger, Philip G. and Eli Ofek, 1995, “Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, 37, 39-65. 
Campbell, J. , 1996, “Understanding Risk and Return”, Journal of Political Economy, 
104,298-345. 
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and Larry Lang, 1999, “Expropriation of Minority 
Shareholders in East Asia”, World Bank, mimeo. 
Comment, R. and G. A. Jarrell, 1995, “Corporate Focus and Stock Returns,” Journal 
of Financial Economics 37, 67-87. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Ross Levine, 1999, “Bank-Based and Market-Based 
Financial Systems: Cross-Country Comparisons,” World Bank, mimeo. 
Denis, D.J., D.K. Denis and A. Sarin, 1997, “Agency Problem, Equity Ownership, 
and Corporate Diversification,” Journal of Finance 52, 135-160. 
Fauver, L., J. Houston and A. Naranjo, 1999, “Capital Market Development, Legal 
Systems and the Value of Corporate Diversification: A Cross-Country 
Analysis,” Mimeo, University of Florida. 
Gertner, R., D. Scharfstein, and J. Stein, 1994, “Internal vs. External Capital 
Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1211-1230. 
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1996, “The Capital Budgeting Process, Incentives and 
Information,” Journal of Finance 51, 1139-1174. 
Houston, J., C. James and D. Marcus, 1997, “Capital Market Frictions and the Role of 
Internal Capital Markets in Banking,” Journal of Financial Economics 46, 
135-164. 
Jensen, M. C., 1986, "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers", American Economic Review. Papers And Proceedings, 76:323-29 
May. 
Jensen, M.C., 1989, “Eclipse of the Public Corporation,” Harvard Business Review 67, 
61-74. 
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu, 1999a, “Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging 
Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups”, Journal of 
Finance, forthcoming. 
Khanna, Tarun, and Krishna Palepu, 1999b, “Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, 
and Corporate Strategy: The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and 
India,” Working Paper, Harvard Business School. 
Lamont, O., 1997, “Cash Flows and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital 
Markets,” Journal of Finance 52, 83-109.   22 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1997, “Legal 
Determinants of External Finance,” Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150. 
Lang, Larry H.P. and René M. Stulz, 1994, “Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and 
Firm Performance,” Journal of Political Economy 102, 1248-1280. 
Lins, K. and H. Servaes, 1999a, “International Evidence on the Value of Corporate 
Diversification,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Lins, K. and H. Servaes, 1999b, “Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Emerging 
Markets?” Working Paper, University of North Carolina. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1988, “Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-
315. 
Rajan, R., H. Servaes, and L. Zingales, 1999, “The Cost of Diversity: The 
Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment,” Journal of Finance, 
forthcoming. 
Scharfstein, D.S., 1998, “The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from 
Diversified Conglomerates,” Working Paper, MIT Sloan School of 
Management. 
Scharfstein, David and Jeremy Stein, 1997, “The Dark Side of Internal Capital 
Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment”, NBER 
working paper no 5969. 
Servaes, H., 1996, “The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger 
Wave,” Journal of Finance 51, 1201-1225. 
Shin, H. and R. Stulz, 1998, “Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 113, 531-552. 
Stein, J., 1997, “Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate 
Resources”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 111-134. 
Williamson, O. E., 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, NY: 
The Free Press. 
Wolfenzon, Daniel, 1999, “A Theory of Pyramidal Structures,” Harvard University, 
mimeo, February. 
   23 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Single and Multi-Segment Firms 
 
The primary data source is Worldscope, amended by the Asian and Japan Company Handbooks.  The sample spans the period 1991-1998.  Firms with missing 
segment sales data are excluded.  Firms with their primary business in financial services (SIC 6000-6999) are also excluded.  Company segments are defined at the 
two-digit SIC code level.  Firms are classified as single-segment if at least 90 percent of their total sales are derived from one two-digit SIC code segment.  The 
remaining firms are classified as multi-segment firms. 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period (1992-1996) 
   Multi-segment  firms    Single-segment  firms  
 Number  (Percentage  Average  assets  Number (Percentage  Average  assets 
    of total firms)  (Millions of US$)    of total firms)  (Millions of US$) 
        
Hong  Kong  383 66  1181  198 34 895 
Indonesia  73  42 693  101 58 393 
Japan  6053 67 2901  2919 33 2279 
Korea  (South)  254 64  1687  141 36  2212 
Malaysia  434 69 641  199 31 550 
Philippines  31  34 533 60  66 407 
Singapore  249 68 528  115 32 747 
Taiwan  33  35 830 61  65 625 
Thailand  106 27 460  291 73 342 
        
All  countries 7616 65 2494  4085 35 1846   24 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics of Single and Multi-Segment Firms 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Crisis period (1997 and 1998) 
   Multi-segment  firms    Single-segment  firms  
 Number  (Percentage  Average  assets  Number (Percentage  Average  assets 
    of total firms)  (Millions of US$)    of total firms)  (Millions of US$) 
        
Hong  Kong  159  65 1157 84  35  931 
Indonesia  34  47 899 39  53 583 
Japan  1357 69 2357  614  31 1969 
Korea  (South)  113  63 2300 66  37 2696 
Malaysia  169 67 678 82  33 575 
Philippines  17  37 816 29  63 604 
Singapore  97  66 595 49  34 618 
Taiwan  12  35 1268 22  65  869 
Thailand  41  27 538  109 73 402 
        
All  countries 1999 65 1949  1094 35 1504 
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Table 2: Comparison of Performance for Diversified Firms Pre-Crisis and During the Crisis 
This table compares the performance of diversified East Asian firms before and after the 1997 Asian Crisis.  The sample includes 1999 firms from nine 
economies.  Data reported on or after December 1997 are classified as crisis data.  Data reported prior to that are classified as pre-crisis data.  Performance is 
measured by excess profit margin (Panel A) and excess market value (Panel B).  The firms are classified into three groups according to the income levels of their 
country origins.  According to the World Bank definition, the high-income group includes firms from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan.  The higher 
middle-income group includes firms from Korea and Malaysia.  The lower middle-income groups includes firms from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  
Panel A: Excess profit margin 
  Mean  Median 
 Crisis  Pre-crisis  Difference  T-statistic  Crisis Pre-crisis  Difference  Z-statistic 
All  countries  -0.0200 -0.0118 -0.0082 -2.08** -0.0250 -0.0230 -0.0020  -0.64 
          
Income  group          
High-income  -0.0141 -0.0136 -0.0005  -0.13  -0.0230 -0.0240 0.0010  0.29 
Higher  Middle-income  -0.0637 -0.0074 -0.0563  -3.72***  -0.0435 -0.0210 -0.0225  -1.83* 
Lower  Middle-income  0.0079 0.0302 -0.0223  -0.72  -0.0425 0.0040 -0.0465  -1.24 
          
Panel B: Excess market value 
 Mean  Median 
 Crisis  Pre-crisis  Difference  T-statistic  Crisis Pre-crisis  Difference  Z-statistic 
All  countries  -0.0369 -0.0272 -0.0097  -0.56  -0.047  -0.0418 -0.0052  -0.33 
          
Income  group          
High-income  -0.0237 -0.0304 0.0067  0.36  -0.0408 -0.0444 0.0036  0.14 
Higher  Middle-income  -0.0507 -0.0165 -0.0342  -0.62  -0.0747 -0.0325 -0.0422  -0.68 
Lower  Middle-income  -0.2365 0.0434 -0.2799 -2.42** -0.1358 0.0435 -0.1793 -1.79* 
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Table 3: OLS Regressions of Excess Profit Margin (EPM) on Diversification and 
Economic Development 
 
The primary data source is Worldscope, amended by Asian and Japan Company Handbooks.  The 
sample spans the period 1991-1998.  Firms with missing segment sales data are excluded.  Firms with 
their primary business in financial services (SIC 6000-6999) are also excluded.  Company segments 
are defined at the two-digit SIC code level.  Firms are classified as single-segment if at least 90 percent 
of their total sales are derived from one two-digit SIC code segment.  The remaining firms are 
classified as multi-segment firms. The dependent variable, excess profit margin, is defined in the text.  
Regressions (1) and (3) include country dummy variables (not reported). All regressions include year-
dummies (not reported). Significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent are denoted by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
 
  SEG=diversification dummy  SEG=segment number 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
INTERCEPT  -0.1283*** -0.1216*** -0.1273*** -0.1219*** 
  (-7.75) (-7.61) (-7.70) (-7.41) 
      
CRISIS  -0.0122* -0.0124* -0.0148* -0.0154* 
  (-1.72) (-1.73) (-1.78) (-1.84) 
      
GNP   -0.0118    0.0371 
   (-0.48)    (0.12) 
      
SEG  -0.0206*** -0.0076 -0.0109*** -0.005* 
  (-5.00) (-0.74) (-7.97) (-1.63) 
      
SEG*CRISIS  0.0074 -0.0376** 0.0031 -0.0094** 
  (0.83) (-2.41) (1.09) (-2.19) 
      
SEG*GNP   -0.5448    -0.2450** 
   (-1.57)  (-2.30) 
      
SEG*GNP*CRISIS   1.6610***  0.4817*** 
   (3.43)  (3.78) 
      
LOG(ASSETS)  0.0103*** 0.0101*** 0.0112*** 0.0109*** 
  (8.52) (8.51) (9.23) (9.14) 
      
Adj.  R-square  0.0099 0.0074 0.0128 0.0108 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of Excess Market Value (EXV) on Diversification and  
Economic Development 
 
The primary data source is Worldscope, amended by the Asian and Japan Company Handbooks.  The 
sample spans the period 1991-1998.  Firms with missing segment sales data are excluded.  Firms with 
their primary business in financial services (SIC 6000-6999) are also excluded.  Company segments 
are defined at the two-digit SIC code level.  Firms are classified as single-segment if at least 90 percent 
of their total sales are derived from one two-digit SIC code segment.  The remaining firms are 
classified as multi-segment firms. The dependent variable, excess value, is defined in the text. 
Regressions (1) and (3) include country dummies (not reported).  All regressions include year dummies 
(not reported).  Significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent are denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 
  SEG=diversification dummy  SEG=segment number 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
INTERCEPT  -0.3307*** -0.2032*** -0.3342*** -0.2108*** 
  (-6.36) (-4.03) (-6.42) (-4.06) 
      
CRISIS  -0.0164 -0.0211 -0.0335 -0.0401 
  (-0.72) (-0.93) (-1.27) (-1.51) 
      
GNP   -2.7917***  -2.3776*** 
   (-3.61)  (-2.60) 
      
SEG -0.0506***  -0.0759**  -0.0162***  -0.0144 
  (-3.90) (-2.34) (-3.78) (-1.48) 
      
SEG*CRISIS 0.0113  -0.0879*  0.0098  -0.0107 
  (0.40) (-1.79) (1.10) (-0.79) 
      
SEG*GNP   0.8136    -0.0457 
   (0.74)    (-0.13) 
      
SEG*GNP*CRISIS   3.8825***    0.8603** 
   (2.54)  (2.14) 
      
LOG(ASSETS)  0.0260*** 0.0230*** 0.0268*** 0.0231*** 
  (6.83) (6.12) (6.97) (6.11) 
      
Adj.  R-square  0.0073 0.0043 0.0072 0.0034 
Number of Obs.  14702  14702  14702  14702 
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Table 5: OLS Regressions of Excess Profit Margin (EPM) on Diversification and  
the Development of the Banking System and Capital Markets 
 
The primary data source is Worldscope, amended by the Asian and Japan Company Handbooks.  The 
sample spans the period 1991-1998.  Firms with missing segment sales data are excluded.  Firms with 
their primary business in financial services (SIC 6000-6999) are also excluded.  Company segments 
are defined at the two-digit SIC code level.  Firms are classified as single-segment if at least 90 percent 
of their total sales are derived from one two-digit SIC code segment.  The remaining firms are 
classified as multi-segment firms. The dependent variable is excess profit margin (EPM). FDEV in 
equations (1) and (3) is the ratio of bank assets to GDP and the ratio of market capitalization to GDP in 
equations (2) and (4). The variables come from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). All regressions 
include year dummies (not reported). Significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent are denoted by ***, **, 
and * respectively. 
 
  SEG=diversification dummy  SEG=segment number 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
INTERCEPT  -0.0991*** -0.0814*** -0.1129*** -0.0881*** 
  (-5.29) (-4.39) (-5.43) (-4.93) 
      
CRISIS -0.0136*  -0.0105  -0.0144*  -0.0159* 
  (-1.89) (-1.47) (-1.72) (-1.90) 
      
FDEV -0.0233**  -0.0354***  -0.0084  -0.0222** 
  (-2.18) (-5.16) (-0.59) (-2.88) 
      
SEG  -0.0196 -0.0573*** -0.0571 -0.0172*** 
  (-1.04) (-6.24) (-0.21) (-5.98) 
      
SEG*CRISIS -0.0659**  -0.0222  -0.0236***  -0.0078* 
  (-2.49) (-1.58) (-3.14) (-1.74) 
      
SEG*FDEV -0.0022  0.0388***  -0.0093*  0.0059** 
  (-0.18) (4.25) (-1.84) (2.38) 
      
SEG*FDEV  0.0542*** 0.0182 0.0219*** 0.0043 
*CRISIS  (2.95) (1.48) (3.83) (1.43) 
      
LOG(ASSETS) 0.0104***  0.0093***  0.0110***  0.0096* 
  (8.79) (7.89) (9.34) (8.44) 
      
Adj.  R-square  0.0079 0.0089 0.0109 0.0104 
Number of Obs.  14702  14702  14702  14702 
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Table 6: OLS Regressions of Excess Market Value (EXV) on Diversification and  
the Development of the Banking System and Capital Markets 
 
The primary data source is Worldscope, amended by the Asian and Japan Company Handbooks.  The 
sample spans the period 1991-1998.  Firms with missing segment sales data are excluded.  Firms with 
their primary business in financial services (SIC 6000-6999) are also excluded.  Company segments 
are defined at the two-digit SIC code level.  Firms are classified as single-segment if at least 90 percent 
of their total sales are derived from one two-digit SIC code segment.  The remaining firms are 
classified as multi-segment firms. The dependent variable is excess value (EXV).  FDEV in equations 
(1) and (3) is the ratio of bank assets and the ratio of market capitalization to GDP in equations (2) and 
(4). The variables come from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). All regressions include year 
dummies (not reported).  Significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent are denoted by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
 
  SEG=diversification dummy  SEG=segment number 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
INTERCEPT  -0.1229** -0.2345*** -0.1353** -0.2452*** 
  (-2.08) (-4.32) (-2.05) (-4.36) 
      
CRISIS  -0.0186 -0.0097 -0.0344 -0.0274 
  (-0.84) (-0.43) (-1.32) (-1.08) 
      
FDEV  -0.1044***  -0.0283 -0.0882** -0.0312 
  (-3.09) (-1.28) (-2.16) (-1.42) 
      
SEG  -0.1757***  -0.1602*** -0.0324 -0.0362*** 
  (-2.92) (-5.07) (-1.62) (-4.03) 
      
SEG*CRISIS  -0.1692**  -0.0082 -0.0424* -0.0058 
  (-2.12) (-0.14) (-1.79) (-0.36) 
      
SEG*FDEV 0.0987**  0.1118***  0.0182  0.0181** 
  (2.03) (3.86) (1.20) (2.30) 
      
SEG*FDEV  0.1619** 0.0052 0.0444** 0.0062 
*CRISIS  (2.46) (0.16) (2.45) (0.26) 
      
LOG(ASSETS)  0.0208*** 0.0217*** 0.0204*** 0.0213*** 
  (5.63) (5.88) (5.52) (5.82) 
      
Adj.  R-square  0.0046 0.0052 0.0037 0.0039 
Number of Obs.  14702  14702  14702  14702 
  